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sustain the conviction. Both the police and the felons were firing
.38-caliber weapons, and the defense raised the point that a police
bullet may have killed the officer. There was evidence from which
the jury could infer that one of the felons did the killing, and the
use of the proximate cause theory seems to have been unnecessary
in sustaining the verdict of guilty.
The Court's approval of proximate cause in Hornbeck, however,
should not lead it to the holding of the principal case under a similar
fact situation. The felony-murder provisions of the Florida statute
require that the killing be "unlawful" and be done "in the perpetration of or in the attempt to perpetrate" a felony. 9 In Florida the
killing of a fleeing felon by his victim is not unlawful but justifiable. 10
Furthermore, although the Pennsylvania court did not concern itself
with the point, a killing done in direct opposition to the commission
of a felony cannot be said to be in the perpetration of it."

The far-reaching decision by the Pennsylvania court is contrary
to the firmly established principle that penal statutes are to be strictly
construed. Though the results obtained may be thought desirable
under particular circumstances, the proximate cause theory is a weak
basis upon which to justify a conviction of murder. Deterrence of
crime is a commendable objective, but if responsibility for criminal
conduct needs enlarging it is a job for the legislature.
ROBERT L. SEELEY

PLEADING: AMENDMENTS TO CONFORM TO
THE EVIDENCE
Carvell v. Kinsey, 87 So.2d 577 (Fla.1956)
Defendant owner listed his building for sale with plaintiff realtors, who procured defendant purchaser. All parties executed a
contract whereby the purchaser made a deposit with one of the
realtors and the owner agreed to pay the realtors a brokerage fee
for having secured a purchaser. Subsequently a flaw in the title was
discovered, and the purchaser withdrew his offer. The realtor holding
9FLA. STAT. §782.04 (1955).

lOFLA. STAT. §782.02 (1955).
-iSee Commonwealth v. Moore, 121 Ky. 97, 88 S.W. 1085 (1905); Commonwealth
v. Campbell, 89 Mass. (7 Allen) 541 (1863).
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the deposit, which was claimed in whole or in part by all parties,
sought court disposition of the funds. Defendant owner admitted in
his pleadings that he owed the brokerage fee to the realtors, but
after hearing the evidence the chancellor held that the owner was
not liable for the fee. On appeal, HELD, it is the responsibility of parties-litigant to frame the issues by proper pleadings, and the parties are
bound by the allegations in their pleadings. Decree reversed.
The common law rules of procedure developed into a highly
technical system that put great emphasis on the pleadings. The rules
forced the parties to formulate issues before the trial had begun, and
required that the proofs correspond to the allegations.2 The modem
codes, however, are designed to put less emphasis on the issue forming
3
process and to allow a more liberal construction of the pleadings.
Illustrative of this trend is Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.15 (b)
providing for automatic amendment of pleadings:
"When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express
or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all
respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such
amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them
to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be
made upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment or decree; but failure so to amend shall not affect the
result of the trial of these issues."
The almost identical federal rule4 has been interpreted with liberality
and with a view toward eliminating technicalities and simplifying
procedure. 5 Recent opinions of the Florida Court have reflected a
6
similar attitude.
12 (2d ed. 1947).
2E.g., Pinney v. Pinney, 46 Fla. 559, 35 So. 95 (1903); Stockton v. National Bank,
45 Fla. 590, 34 So. 897 (1903); Johnson v. McKinnon, 45 Fla. 388, 34 So. 272 (1903).
ICLARK, CODE PLEADING

3CLARK, CODE PLEADING 344 (2d ed. 1947); see also Wigginton, New Florida

Common Law Rules, 3 U. FLA. L. REv. 1 (1950).
4FED. R. Civ. P. 15 (b).

5Fireside Marshmallow Co. v. Frank Quinlan Constr. Co., 199 F.2d 511 (8th Cir.
1952) (automatic amendment to change theory of relief or defense); Nester v.
Western Union Tel. Co., 25 F. Supp. 478, 481 (S.D. Cal. 1938), rev'd on other
grounds, 309 U.S. 582 (1940) (automatic amendment allowing damages different
from those alleged); see Holtzoff, A Judge Looks at the Rules After Fifteen Years
of Use, 15 F.R.D. 155 (1953).
6XCelch v. Moothart, 89 So.2d 485 (Fla. 1956); Shores v. Murphy, 88 So.2d 294
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The principal case is the first since the inception of the Florida
code to raise the issue of whether an admission in the answer, regardless of the evidence introduced at the trial, establishes the liability
of the defendant to the plaintiff. The Court indicated that its decision was based on the unequivocal admission of liability in the
pleadings and the failure of the defendant to amend his answer by
a denial of indebtedness when given the opportunity. Although the
opinion clearly infers that evidence of the defendant's nonliability
was introduced, the Court did not discuss the application of rule
1.15 (b). Why the Court failed to mention the rule, much less apply
it, is unknown. Perhaps defendant's counsel failed to bring the rule
to the attention of the Court, resulting in its being overlooked. The fact that defendant had failed to amend should not
provide the answer; it is precisely to avoid this result that the rule
provides for "automatic" amendment. It is possible that the Court
felt that the determination of liability was based on insufficient evidence to constitute a trial of the issue, or that the plaintiff was
caught by surprise when the issue was raised. If either of these assumptions is correct, there is no indication of it in the opinion.
Within a month after the principal case was decided Welch v.
Moothart 7 came before the Court. In that case the trial court denied
the defendant the right to amend his answer to include a defense
contested in the trial but not included in the pleadings. Defendant
appealed an adverse judgment; the trial court decision was sustained
and the amendment held unnecessary. The Court quoted Florida rule
1.15 (b) and applied it on the theory that the defense, although not
included in the pleadings, was in fact tried, and an express amendment was unnecessary because 1.15 (b) automatically amended the
plea to conform with the evidence at the trial. Although it is true
that the Welch decision and the earlier cases" applying rule 1.15 (b)
did not involve a complete reversal of position as did the principal
case, this should make no difference if the Court is to recognize the
purpose of the rule.
Whatever the reason for the Court's refusal to amend the pleading
automatically, the case is inconsistent with the general trend in
Florida and in the federal courts. The decision, if it is to be followed
(Fla. 1956); Causeway Loan Co. v. Bucklew, 81 So.2d 212 (Fla. 1955); Palatka v.
Woods, 78 So.2d 562, 564 (Fla. 1955) (concurring opinion).
,89 So.2d 485 (Fla. 1956).
sSee note 6 supra.
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